This past week the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its annual “World Drug Report”, which contained some interesting insights on the global illicit drug markets.
Led by Antonio Maria Costa, the UNODC provides governments with information on a range of issues on crime but is mostly known for its World Drug Reports which survey trends and patterns in drug production, trafficking and consumption. It is important to note, however, that the UNODC lacks the resources to solidly support all of its research, which therefore are sometimes based on weak data and relevant information. Moreover, the UNODC has been politically compromised by UN member-states that pressure it into fully and completely supporting the war on drugs. While not nearly as vocal or condemnatory as the INCB (International Narcotics Control Board; essentially an arm of US foreign drug control policy), the UNODC has historically suppressed its own reports that look favourably on anything other than complete prohibition of all drugs. Unlike other international organizations such as the WHO (World Health Organization) and UNAIDS, UNODC has railed against harm reduction tactics such as needle exchanges that have a demonstrable positive impact on public health, though with the 2010 World Drug Report they altered this stance. Legitimate concerns about the organization can be found at the Transnational Institute website: here and here. I would add that the UNODC's support for a provision in international treaties that considers coca a plant with no medical value that must be eliminated as soon as possible is either a demonstration of its ignorance or its unwillingness to stand up for cultural differences. Coca is a plant that has been produced for thousands of years and is culturally important to numerous people in Latin America. To equate it with cocaine – or consider it worse – is an affront to the cultural traditions of other cultures. But, I digress...
The 2010 World Drug Report begins by noting some decisions by the UN General Assembly, which in 1998 voted to eliminate or significantly reduce “illicit drug production and abuse by 2008.” Instead of pointing out the abysmal failure of these same member states to devote the resources necessary to have even a moderate impact on drug production, the monograph merely states that member states were “not satisfied with the results.” Of course, a new goal has been set for 2019 and this time – by god – we're going to achieve it. Until, of course, 2019 arrives with little fanfare, little to no effective changes in drug production and consumption, and a new declaration is made that drug represent a significant and growing problem, which will be eliminated by 2029.
It's odd to read a report that implicitly points out the chronic weaknesses of international drug control, but which also declares in its introduction that “[t]his approach is paying off.” To support that statement, the UNODC draws upon weak data suggesting that the cultivation of opiates and cocaine has dropped for the past two years by almost a quarter. What they don't tell you is that two years does not really tell you anything about illicit drugs, and that only an extremely small percentage of all illicit drugs produced is actually required to satisfy the desires of all the world's consumers combined. Besides, the users that matter most are problem-users who have serious addictions, not necessarily the irregular consumer who is more susceptible to price fluctuations.
The UNODC, in effect, presents data in lots of fancy charts but is short on research-based analysis to back up any of their claims. If they do provide analysis that points out failures in drug policy, they simply argue that there are therefore all the more reasons to maintain or renew the course. More worringly, they often provide misleading information about how we are winning the war on drugs through the use of short-term time frames. In the past 2 years, opiate and coca production has fallen! Well, it also grew to record-highs in the 2000s, and if I know my economics 101 (demand and supply) a glut on the market will inevitably lead to a reduction in prices for an oversupplied crop, and reduced incentives for farmers to plant it. Opium production may indeed have fallen in the past two years, but again production is declining from the highest levels on record in 2007. If anything, opium production is far larger than its historic levels.
From the year 2000's unprecedented production levels to 2009, coca cultivation in Colombia has fallen by roughly 58 percent, while it grew by more than 30 percent in Peru and Bolivia. The problem is that improved production techniques made up for the decline in absolute cultivation levels. We spend billions of dollars a year manually and aerially eradicating coca in Latin America, and in return the farmers and drug trafficking organizations simply innovated and increased their sophistication.
I don't want to unfairly criticize the UNODC, which actually does a better job than the INCB. The point I make is important if only because the UNODC's findings are reported as fact by numerous newspapers without really analyzing the document itself. You hear about a “x decline in x drug” or “x increase in production of x drug” but you don't get the context or information that would demonstrate the futility of fighting the war on drugs. To its credit, the UNODC has been continually improving the quality of its reports over the past two years, but they are still short of critically analyzing the global drug market.
Once you step back and look at drug control since the 1970s, in 10 year increments, very little has changed except the popularity of certain drugs. In terms of overall use, levels are probably higher now than they were in the 1970s, and perhaps slightly lower than in the 1990s. In our 70-year war on drugs, we've accomplished close to nothing. Things we have accomplished – reducing marijuana production in Mexico in the 1970s, for instance – had unintended consequences (in this case, contributing to the rise of domestic indoor marijuana cultivation).
Senator Obama once called the war on drugs an absolute failure and advocated for decriminalizing marijuana. I wonder if President Obama will eventually step up and do the same, but based on his current drug policy (or lack thereof), I strongly doubt it. And while that's incredibly disappointing, it's hardly surprising. Organizations like the UNODC and the INCB (and in the US: the DEA) attempt to justify and perpetuate a war on drugs that is costly, ineffective and more harmful to both drug users and the general population. As long as the UNODC continues to do so, we will continue to waste our limited resources and like Stephen Harper renew the war on drugs.
One day, I hope policymakers will realize that more resources does not equal more results, especially if your baseline is no results. Drugs are a problem in society, but they are a health one – not a criminal justice one. The UNODC claims it believes that drug policy is centred on health. But by advocating the war on drugs, they advocate for prison terms – in the US and, soon, Canada, mandatory minimum ones – and harmful policies that worsen rather than improve our drug problem.
Tomorrow or Thursday, I will post a critical analysis of Harper's proposed drug policy changes, and point out the ways that this will fundamentally and radically shift drug policy towards that of the United States in the 1980s.
Interesting comments. My two cents on cocaine:
The decline in coca production is due entirely to developments in the Colombian Armed Conflict. Between about 1998 and 2004 the kidnapping rate got out of control, which led to the election of hard-line President Alvaro Uribe Velez on a law-and-order ticket. In his two terms in office Uribe's policies have significantly reduced the territory controlled by the FARC guerillas; a group that has taxed coca production to fund their operations for the last thirty years.
So while you are correct to note that the decline in global coca production is temporary, I would argue that is comes the transition from Colombia to Peru/Bolivia rather than a glut in the world supply. Thus drug enforcement can indeed reduce supply in the short run, but in the long run it simply displaces the production to a different locale and/or raises the risk premium. The effect on consumption is negligible as you correctly note, and the higher risk premiums often lead to more violence.
In the coming decade I would speculate that world cocaine production will increase dramatically as people in the developing world become increasingly able to afford it. We will likely see more cocaine from Peru and Bolivia rather than Colombia, but the latter will remain an important producer as disbanded guerrilla and paramilitary forces continue their operations under the apolitical moniker 'illegal armed groups.' I would even suggest that these are potentially more violent and indiscriminate because they don't have the same political incentives to maintain their public image as the belligerents in the civil war.
Plus if Calderon is successful in Mexico, the cocaine trade will move back through the Caribbean. Which thus begs the question: How many countries do we want to destabilize chasing this fantasy of a drug-free society? If Obama doesn't like cocaine, why not tell his friends in Hollywood to quit snorting so much of it?
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You have a very interesting blog. I haven't written in mine since the fall, though it might be interesting to combine forces and make a bigger product. Check mine out.
Posted by: Baribo | 06/30/2010 at 11:54 PM
It's true that the conflict in Colombia has played a key role in the rise (and fall) of coca production there. Part of this is due to US Policy, which assisted Colombia during the war against the Medellin and Cali cartels. Once they were dismantled, former employees and newcomers to the market formed "baby cartels" that lost power relative to their Mexican counterparts. In effect, due to their smaller size they had less control over the supply chain. Once FARC realized it could earn more money producing coca or "protecting" coca farms, it became more involved and production increased. They too had little ability to move the cocaine into the United States, so they also deferred to the Mexican DTOs.
Personally, I strongly doubt Calderon will make any real success against the DTOs in Mexico. The army has been committing gross human rights violations, and the population is steadily turning against it, especially in regions where they are heavily concentrated.
Let me know if you want to contribute to the blog, because I've considered asking for contributors to bolster the content and keep it updated.
Posted by: The Psychic Octopus | 07/01/2010 at 06:14 PM