Another day on the killing streets of Juaréz (Source: http://publicintelligence.net)
When Felipe Calderón won 2006's contentious elections, he pledged to bring war to the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)* that were corrupting, corroding and murdering their way towards immense riches. Most local police forces in the country have long made their choice of plata o plomo (silver or lead; the bribe or the bullet), as have the state and federal police forces. The army, meanwhile, is somehow considered less corrupt but are renowned for their brutal torture and kidnappings.
Calderon has deployed numerous federal police and soldiers to border regions and areas facing high levels of drug production or trafficking. As of late 2009, at least 40,000 have been dispersed and it is likely that more have followed in recent months. But the violence, mayhem and murders have not stopped. In fact, since deploying government forces the situation has gotten much worse. The numbers below might appear to speak for themselves, but really they do not. This list of ejecuciones (DTO-related murders) must be considered indicative, as the Mexican army and police forces also murder, but for a Mexican reporter to tell this would result in his or her death – so it is not reported. If one is lucky, an army murder is classified as “cartel-related”, and is included.
|
Year |
Murders |
Change |
|
2003 |
1,365 |
-- |
|
2004 |
1,304 |
-4.4% |
|
2005 |
1,537 |
+17.9% |
|
2006 |
2,120 |
+37.9% |
|
2007 |
2,275 |
+7.3% |
|
2008 |
5,207 |
+128.9% |
|
2009 |
6,587 |
+26.5% |
|
2010 (June 18) |
5,229 |
+58.8** |
|
Sources: Justice in Mexico Project; Grayson, 2010 |
||
** - Assumes equal distribution of murders each month and counts June as a full month; it should be considered a conservative estimate.
You will probably not hear about most of this. Journalism in Mexico is an endangered enterprise, but not for the same reasons as elsewhere. Reporters without Borders lists the country as among the most dangerous places in the world to work as a journalist, and with good reason. Writers must print exactly what they are told by the army, or the police, and are careful to stay far away from difficult questions. Publishing can get you killed by the DTOs, drug gangs, the army or even the police, and you would probably never know why or what story details led to your death.
The United States to the Rescue
The 2008 Merída Initiative, a three-year 1.8 billion dollar plan, allocates about 80-90% percent of its budget to providing money, training and equipment for Mexico law enforcement and military. An extremely small portion will be devoted to institution-building and promoting the rule of law, even though Mexico's justice system is hardly worthy of its name. Most people who are arrested do not see judges for weeks or months, and trials are a formality in which the prosecution submits its case that is accordingly accepted as fact.
Individual drug trafficking organizations in Mexico makes billions of dollars a year, partly as a result of NAFTA, which opened the US border to a huge volume of goods from Mexico. In fact, in 1995, the year after NAFTA took effect, the number of commercial trucks crossing into the United States from Mexico roughly doubled. As a result, Mexican DTOs have a significant comparative advantage in supplying and distribution illicit drugs in the massive American market. They enjoy a near-monopoly on the transport of cocaine (~90%), heroin (~70%), methamphetamines (~70%), and also hold a substantial portion of the cannabis market. Estimates suggest the DTOs earn more money than 40% of the top Fortune 500 companies.
It does not take a leap of faith to suggest the Merída Initiative is hopelessly flawed, and will likely result in more deaths and little progress in the war on drugs. Deploying the army to regions of Mexico plagued with violence was welcomed at first, but human rights complaints against them have soared – and that's just the official, heavily underreported number. Worse, the army is now open to massive levels of corruption. Shipments of cocaine are seized, and people arrested, tortured, killed and dumped or buried, and the drugs finally “disappear”.
The problem that undermines the joint Mexico-US initiative to fight the DTOs is unsurmountable - the laws of economics: if there is demand, there will be supply. And if you prohibit a substance, the profit to be made in supplying it will soar. Just as alcohol prohibition led to the rise to Al Capones and immense police, judicial and political corruption, so does drug prohibition. The sooner the United States realizes that the war on drugs is a war against the laws of economics, a war against the very free markets they seek to spread throughout the world, the better. Unfortunately, I don't see that happening anytime soon. Instead, I see a few plausible scenarios for Mexico:
A Return to the Past
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governed Mexico for over 70 years, and it did so through corporatism, corruption and patronage networks that ensured its candidates would remain victorious. Mayors, Governors and Federal officials created networks with DTOs, accepting bribes and tacitly permitting (or explicity participating in) the drug trade as long as violence was kept to a minimum, out of sight. As other political parties gained public office in the 1980s, they were not able to amass enough power to sufficiently control the DTOs. It is no wonder that the earliest spikes in drug-related violence occurred in states led by opposition parties.
A recent NPR report suggests that the Mexican government may be favouring the Sinaloa DTO (the largest, led by “El Chapo” Guzman) and targeting other groups with greater resources. It is therefore plausible that the Mexican government could reach another tacit agreement with one or more DTO in exchange for a return to “normalcy”, at least in terms of murders and kidnappings.
While I am somewhat skeptical of this situation emerging, it is certainly plausible given Mexico's history and its incredible institutional decay. Simply put, the Mexican state does not have the resources to defeat the DTOs.
A Slow Decay, A Failing State
This could be called the “Ciudad Juaréz” scenario – a city that is dying, in which silence is necessary but sufficient for life, in which hundreds of murders are committed by drug gangs, DTOs, the police and army. The Mexican state completely loses its ability to control events in certain areas of the country, which become virtual fiefdoms for DTOs or battlegrounds when they clash for control of a given drug route.
I would consider this scenario more likely than the former, simply because US pressure on the Mexican government to maintain its forces in destabilizing regions could lead to further desertions (which in the army are already extremely high) and a total collapse of the last vestige of the state's ability to control violence: the army. The army is becoming more corrupt and more willing to use brutal tactics, but it is still less hopelessly incompetent and DTO-infiltrated as the police in Mexico – which go from bad to worse at each successive level: federal, state, and local.
Conclusions
It is not as if the Mexican government – at least the Federal government – is not trying to bring the fight to Mexican DTOs. But it is outmatched, out gunned, and will likely be outwitted by wealthier and more organizationally-adept forces. Killing DTO leaders have not brought about much success; instead, it is split DTOs into smaller ones that are no less dangerous, but that also can fight for a greater market share. In my opinion, the only real solution lies in tackling the demand for illicit drugs in the United States itself. This could be achieved through a whole range of options, some more politically palatable than others.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that President Obama called the drug war an “utter failure” declared he favoured the decriminalization of marijuana, he has yet to put any of these words into action. In fact, under his watch the United States will spend 65% of the total Federal drug control budget on reducing the supply of drugs through law enforcement and only 35% on reducing the demand for drugs. These numbers remain essentially unchanged from those under President Bush. Projections for the 2011 Fiscal Year are essentially unchanged.
While on the one hand I understand Obama's hesitancy to engage with drug policy in the context of the economic recession, I don't see him as surrounded by people who are committed to reforming drug policy – if only given the time to deal with this recession. With Republicans likely to make big gains in the 2010 elections, drug policy will probably go nowhere for the rest of the Presidency. And though I believe Obama has made tough choices and has made a far better leader than any other candidate – from both primaries – its terribly depressing to see this issue totally cast aside.
Policies targeting US drug demand - such as ensuring treatment as opposed to incarceration for non-violent drug users - would take decades to have a demonstrable effect. That's partly why I believe the situation in Mexico will continue to degrade, and the victims will become nameless and forgotten casualties in the 70+ year war on drugs. In the end, we have only ourselves to blame.
Sources
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=918
http://www.justiceinmexico.org
http://www.ondcp.gov/publications/policy/ndcs10/index.html
* Most of the media declares these groups “drug cartels” because the term is popularly used. Unfortunately, the term “cartel” implies at least some level of control over prices, which Mexican (and other) DTOs do not possess because the illicit drug market is much closer to perfect competition.
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