In this commentary on the Failed States Index (FSI), I will briefly examine the political and economic decline in Yemen that threatens the very foundations of the state.
Consider, Yemen's ranking on the FSI from 2007, when the Fund for Peace (http://www.fundforpeace.org) settled on scoring 177 countries. The FSI ranks countries based on several indicators, including demographic pressure, economic distribution between groups, and ability to provide basic government services.
|
Year |
Rank (out of 177 countries) |
|
2007 |
24th |
|
2008 |
21st |
|
2009 |
18th |
|
2010 |
15th |
Since 2007, Yemen's institutions have demonstrably declined in their ability to function properly. Unlike some countries that fell in the ranking as a result of the consolidation and (at least partial) improvement in governance, Yemen continues to plummet in the ranking. It's hard to imagine Yemen falling much further, though it's important to consider its neighbour to the South, across the Gulf of Aden: Somalia.
So why has Yemen declined? In large part, I think state neglect has played a large role, though Yemen never had much a central state to begin with. I think four possible factors merit mention:
Pervasive Corruption
The only way to govern Yemen is with money - at least, according to Victoria Clark. Rural Yemen is still dominated by well-armed, battle-hardened tribes and sub-tribes, which President Saleh bribes into docility by paying tribal leaders (sheikhs). The government barely provides any public funding for building roads, schools or important infrastructure, so tribes earn money only by providing a credible and bribable threat to government authority. Within minutes of a phone call from a single influential tribe member, roads can be shut down, land seized and regions made impenetrable – until payments are made. In addition, foreign tourists are often kidnapped by tribes to earn ransoms.
The civil service is bloated, with most people on the payroll receiving a cheque for little to no work. High-ranking military officials and civil servants have seized land illegally across the country, but mostly in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY aka South Yemen, which was the Arab world's only officially Marxist state), whose citizens the government does not trust.
Yemen's Ranking in the Corruptions Perceptions Index:
|
Year |
Rating (1 = extreme corruption; 10 = little to no corruption) |
Ranking (Total number of countries included) |
|
2005 |
2.7 |
103 (158) |
|
2006 |
2.6 |
111 (163) |
|
2007 |
2.5 |
131 (179) |
|
2008 |
2.3 |
141 (180) |
|
2009 |
2.1 |
154 (180) |
Coming to power in 1978 after his two predecessors were killed, President Saleh remains in power for one real reason: he understands tribal customs and exploits them to his advantage by bribing more susceptible opponents, while brutally crushing any opposition that poses an existential threat to his presidency (often using fighters from co-opted tribes).
Since 2005, corruption – or at least perceptions of corruption – has increased relatively dramatically. If you want to open a business, pass through police/military checkpoints littering the country, access hospitals, or any other basic part of daily life, you must be prepared to make the appropriate payments to officials.
Wars, Wars and more Wars
Though the recent Houthi rebellion (2004-2009~) has maintained a ceasefire so far, President Saleh's government remains precarious balanced – and occupied – with two internal wars and a growing, thriving group of jihadists. Take a look at the Wikipedia page on the Houthi rebellion, as I doubt it will remain inactive for long.
Southern grievances arose quickly after the two Yemen's united in 1990, resulting in the country's first civil war in 1994. The current Southern secessionist movement draws its support from a wider range of actors than the previous one, partly because the civil war of 1994 was fought between Northern and Southern (Marxist) military units that had not been merged. In the South, Northern leaders found plentiful land which they appropriated either for personal business, pleasure or state use.
With jihadism, Yemen has always taken a middle road. It actively supported Yemenis who wished to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq to wage jihad against “infidels”, as long as they did not threaten the state at home. Following September 11th, however, the “third generation jihadists” returned from fighting American soldiers in Iraq and became extremely vocal about the Yemeni government's official stance of supporting the US “war on terror”. It remains to be seen if Saleh can maintain control over the jihadists the way he once did – through bribery and, at times, intimidation (but not extradition to the US) – because this generation of jihadists are much less willing to compromise in exchange for limited freedoms. In effect, President Saleh plays a dangerous game: he pretends to fully support the US war on terror, but hardly rounds up jihadists unless his arm is twisted by the United States. In aligning with the US, even in such a tepid way, he risks fully delegitimizing his presidency and his government. It is worth noting that tribal customs are also used by jihadists to remain anonymous and slip past government forces, since tribal custom law dictates that they must provide safe passage and a resting place for anyone that demands it. Lastly, it is also worth pointing out that the government's main intelligence forces are hopelessly compromised with Jihadist sympathizers, who often alert them to any government attempts to crack down.
The result is Yemen devotes a considerable share of government revenue to the military and to its broader security apparatus. Of course, the state's coffers are hardly open to public viewing, so it's anyone's guess how much is actually spent on security. Clark pegs the amount spent on the military alone at no less than 1/6th of Yemen's GDP, and notes that at least one third of the people paid by the military are “ghost soldiers” that show up only for training twice a year.
Economic Mismanagement:
(Note: The sources of these graphs are IMF Country Report 09/100)
In 2008, Yemen earned about 1/3 of its yearly budget from oil exports, and noticeably less than that amount from tax revenue. Domestic hydrocarbon sales remain one of the few things that are actually taxed, though this is offset by the fact that the Yemeni government heavily subsidizes diesel imports, since it has not bothered to fix or upgrade the Aden refinery in order to produce its own. Experience suggests that allowing the diesel subsidy to expire would cost Saleh his Presidency, since even an attempt at a “minor” adjustment led to hoarding and riots. But worse, the subsidized diesel is often siphoned off by smugglers, who bring it to nearby countries and pocket the extra revenue.
Clearly oil forms an overwhelming share of government revenue, and it certainly has allowed President Saleh to maintain his grip on power. Not only does most of the government's foreign exchange reserves come from oil – no surprise since its only other real exports are, in order:
-
Qat (a plant, that is chewed and serves as a stimulant and mild hallucinogenic, similar to amphetamines)
-
Coffee (declining since the country is almost out of water)
-
Honey
Okay, I hear you say: oil is important to the government of Yemen just like every other government in the region, so what? Well, the problem is that oil production is dropping sharply, and will likely be completely exhausted by 2021. And the new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) being unearthed will not make up for the revenue lost from oil production.
Environmental Pressures...
To add fuel to this fire, Sana'a is likely to become the first capital of the world to run out of fresh water, which is predicted to occur sometime in the next 10 to 15 years. Throughout the country, agricultural production has dropped markedly since the days when it produced coffee (ever heard of Mocha [link]?). Now one of the only crops that uses up the precious little water that is left is qat, which is used by around 70 percent of men and about 30 percent of women. And even then, the largest producers are more often than not connected to the government, having earned their right to drill deep underground to extract water from the limited reservoirs below.
The Future of Yemen
It's hard to think a scenario from which the Yemeni state weathers the coming storm and emerges with greater capacity and improved governance. President Saleh is probably among the only people keeping the country functional, and rumours suggest his attempt to anoint his son as successor has met stern resistance. More likely than not, the government will continue to decline slowly and surely until it hardly has any capacity to control events outside of Sana'a and Aden. Of course, it already has a precarious hold over numerous regions of the country, and I would expect tribes to increase their demands as central authority disintegrates. Without the slush fund provided by oil, Saleh (or his successors) will have an extremely difficult time dancing on the many snake heads that line the path ahead.
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